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This paper investigates the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity in different working 
environments. More precisely, it examines the interaction with: i) the skills of the workforce, 
using a more appropriate indicator than the standard distinction between white- and blue 
collar workers, and ii) the uncertainty of the firm economic environment, which has, to our 
knowledge, never been explored on an empirical basis. Using detailed LEED for Belgium, we 
find a hump-shaped relationship between (conditional) wage dispersion and firm productivity. 
This result suggests that up to (beyond) a certain level of wage dispersion, the incentive 
effects of “tournaments” dominate (are dominated by) “fairness” considerations. Findings also 
show that the intensity of the relationship is stronger for highly skilled workers and in more 
stable environments. This might be explained by the fact that monitoring costs and 
production-effort elasticity are greater for highly skilled workers and that in the presence of 
high uncertainty workers have less control over their effort-output relation and associate 
higher uncertainty with more unfair environments. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J31, J24, M52 
  
Keywords:  wage dispersion, labour productivity, working environments, 






Université Libre de Bruxelles 
CP 140 – Avenue F.D. Roosevelt 50 
B-1050 Brussels 
Belgium 
E-mail: frycx@ulb.ac.be   
 
                
 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to Statistics Belgium for giving access to the Structure of Earnings Survey 




The potential influence of pay systems on workers’ productivity is a key issue addressed by 
personnel economics. In this context, relative wages are often considered to play a 
determinant role. Assuming that workers compare their wages with those of their co-workers 
when determining their level of effort, wage dispersion should influence this level and hence 
average firm performance. However, there is no clear theoretical consensus on the 
characteristics of this relationship. First, the “tournament model” proposed by Lazear and 
Rosen (1981) stresses that a more differentiated wage structure stimulates workers’ effort, 
through the incentive resulting from awarding the largest prize to the most productive worker. 
Their approach further suggests that the higher the pay spread, the higher the workers’ 
optimal level of effort. In contrast, other theories argue that wage compression, i.e. a lower 
dispersion, reinforces workers’ productivity by either improving labour relations (Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1988), sustaining and stimulating cohesiveness among the workforce (Levine, 1991) 
or preventing workers from engaging in costly rent-seeking activities instead of productive 
work (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). 
  Given the importance of this issue, a growing empirical literature is devoted to 
analysing the relationship between wage dispersion and firm performance (e.g. Eriksson, 
1999; Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller, 1999; Hibbs and Locking, 2000; Lallemand et al., 
2007; Martins, 2008). Yet the precise impact of wage dispersion on firm performance still 
remains unclear as both positive and negative impacts are suggested. Moreover, studies 
considering that this relationship might be influenced by specific working environments are 
not numerous, even though, as indicated by Pfeffer and Langton (1993), “one of the more 
useful avenues for research on pay systems may be precisely this task of determining not 
which pay scheme is best but, rather, under what conditions salary dispersion has positive 
effects and under what conditions it has negative effects” (p. 383).  
  Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse the sign and magnitude of the impact of 
wage dispersion on firm productivity in the Belgian private sector and to examine whether 
this relationship varies across different working environments. On the one hand, we 
investigate the role played by the skills of the workforce, using a more appropriate indicator 
than the standard distinction between white- and blue-collar workers. To do so, we combine 
information on levels of education and occupations. On the other, we analyse the interaction 
with the uncertainty of the firm economic environment. This has, to our knowledge, never 






  In order to achieve these objectives, we use a large and detailed matched employer-
employee data set for the year 2003 and compute a conditional wage dispersion indicator, as 
suggested by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999). We test for a possible hump-shaped 
relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity and address the potential 
simultaneity problem between these variables. 
  The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
regarding the impact of wage dispersion on firm performance. We describe our methodology 
in section 3 and present the data set in section 4. Section 5 is devoted to a presentation and 
discussion of the impact of wage dispersion on firm performance and to potential differences 
of this impact in different working environments. Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
2.1 Wage dispersion and firm performance 
From a theoretical point of view, Akerlof and Yellen (1988) are among the first to stress that a 
compressed wage distribution improves labour relations and thus firm performance by 
stimulating the average worker’s effort. They develop a model where workers’ effort does not 
only depend on the wage level but also on the degree of wage dispersion within the firm. 
Later, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) develop the notion of fairness through their “fair wage-
effort” hypothesis which shows that a worker will reduce his effort if his actual wage falls 
short of the wage he considers fair. The authors further point out that a wage is regarded as 
fair if the pay spread is lower than the performance differential. Levine (1991) states that 
wage compression, within a firm where teamwork is essential, increases the firm’s total 
productivity by stimulating cohesiveness. Hibbs and Locking (2000) provide a firm-level 
production function in which firms should establish a wage distribution that is more 
compressed than the variation in workers’ productivity. Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990) postulate that wage compression should reduce workers’ incentives to: i) 
withhold information from management in order to increase their influence, ii) engage in 
costly rent-seeking activities instead of productive work, and iii) take personal interest 
decisions, which may not be profitable for the organisation.  
  In contrast to previous “fairness” theories, Lazear and Rosen (1981) develop the 
“tournament” model which emphasises a positive impact of wage dispersion on firm 
performance. According to the authors, firms should establish a performance-based pay 
system where the largest prize is awarded to the most productive worker. Considering two 






the most productive worker receives a high wage (WH) and the least productive one a low 
wage (WL), their model leads to the conclusion that, ceteris paribus, workers’ optimal level of 
effort: i) increases with the prize dispersion (WH – WL), and ii) decreases with the random 
component of output (e.g. luck). Subsequently, McLaughlin (1988) generalises this model for 
n players stressing that there should be a positive correlation between the prize spread and the 
number of contestants as the probability of winning the prize decreases with the number of 
contestants.  
  However, Lazear (1989, 1995) later develops the “hawks and doves” theory where a 
higher wage dispersion generates more competition between workers which may, in turn, 
negatively affect firm performance. This is particularly the case when some workers, the 
“hawks”, are non-cooperative or adopt sabotage activities which reduce the probability that 
less aggressive workers, the “doves”, will win the prize. The author therefore stresses that a 
compressed wage structure is more productive when the positive impact of an output-based 
pay system on firm performance is offset by a lower level of work cohesion due to the 
sabotage behaviour of “hawks”.  
  Empirical studies confirm the ambiguous results to be expected from previous 
theoretical considerations. A first strand of the literature provides evidence in favour of the 
“fairness” theories. This is the case, for instance, of the study by Cowherd and Levine (1992) 
examining business units in North America and Europe, the one by Pfeffer and Langton 
(1993) on academic departments’ performance in the UK and several studies essentially 
concentrated on US professional team sports
[1]. 
  Another strand of the empirical literature supports the “tournament” theory. For 
instance, using US and Swedish data respectively, Main et al. (1993) and Eriksson (1999) 
report a positive impact of top executive pay dispersion on firm performance
[2]. Moreover, 
Lallemand et al. (2007) find that wage dispersion has a positive impact on the performance of 
large Belgian firms in 1995. Also noteworthy is that the study of Hibbs and Locking (2000), 
examining the effects of changes in the overall wage dispersion on the productive efficiency 
of Swedish industries and plants, does not confirm that wage levelling enhances productivity. 
  Besides, some authors find mixed results. Frick et al. (2003) measure the impact of 
wage inequalities on performance across different sports leagues. Their results support 
“fairness” arguments for some leagues and “tournament” theory for others. Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller (1999) and Bingley and Eriksson (2001) report a hump-shaped relationship 
between wage dispersion and firm productivity, in Austria and Denmark respectively, this 






“tournament” theories. Braakmann (2008) also identifies a hump-shaped relationship in 
Germany, albeit very weak. Finally, Martins (2008) finds a positive influence of wage 
dispersion on the performance of Portuguese firms only when fixed effects are not included. 
In contrast, fixed effects estimations reveal a strong negative impact of wage dispersion on 
firm performance.  
 
2.2 Working environments 
Few papers go a step further by investigating the impact of wage dispersion on firm 
performance across several working environments. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) point out that 
the magnitude of the negative impact of wage dispersion on academic departments’ 
performance depends on a person’s position in the salary structure and factors such as 
information, commitment, consensus and the level of certainty in the evaluation process. 
Beaumont and Harris (2003) show that the impact of pay inequality on UK firm performance 
depends on the sector considered and on differences in firms’ size and ownership. Using data 
from the UK, Belfield and Marsden (2003) find that the extent to which the use of 
performance-related pay increases performance depends on the structure of firm monitoring 
environments. Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) show that wage dispersion only has a significant 
positive impact on the productivity of German firms when interaction effects with both the 
type of incentive scheme employed and the industrial relations regime are taken into account.  
  Existing studies thus clearly indicate that the relationship between wage dispersion 
and firm performance should be investigated in interaction with the characteristics of the 
working environment. In this paper, we will focus on the role played by i) the skills of the 
workforce and ii) the uncertainty of the firm economic environment. 
  2.2.1 Skills of the workforce. From a theoretical perspective, Lazear’s model (1989, 
1995) of “hawks and doves” suggests that it is profitable for a firm to adjust its compensation 
scheme to the characteristics of the workforce. The author stresses that a more compressed 
wage structure is preferable at the top level of the firm, where “hawks” are more present. 
Milgrom (1988) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990) also argue that lower levels of wage 
dispersion are more appropriate for white-collar workers because it is more costly to monitor 
their actions in order to prevent them from taking personal interest decisions as wage 
dispersion increases. In contrast, Prendergast (2002) suggests that it is more important to tie 
wages to firm performance for complex positions (occupied by highly skilled workers) as 
they are harder to monitor. The point is that pay-for-performance mechanisms would induce 






dispersion and firm productivity would be stronger among highly skilled workers. Moreover, 
Foss and Laursen (2005) postulate that managers can better apprehend tasks in industries that 
are low-knowledge intensive, which have on average a low-skilled workforce, and therefore 
have less need to use pay-for-performance mechanisms to increase productivity, as the 
asymmetrical information is reduced. According to Barth et al. (2008), highly skilled workers 
should also be more extensively paid according to performance because they can increase 
their productivity more easily than less-skilled workers. 
  Empirical evidence regarding the effect of the composition of the workforce on the 
relationship between wage dispersion and productivity again presents mixed results. On the 
one hand, the turning point of the hump-shaped relationship between wage dispersion and 
firm performance found by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) is encountered at a higher 
level of wage dispersion for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers. On the other 
hand, the study by Bingley and Eriksson (2001) on the Danish private sector also reports a 
hump-shaped relationship but for white-collar staff only, no impact being found for blue-
collar staff. Grund and Westergaard-Nielsen (2008), also analysing the Danish private sector, 
come to the same conclusion when they use the OLS technique while no relation is found 
when they include fixed effects. Heyman (2005) also finds a positive impact of wage 
dispersion on profits for both managers and white-collar workers in Sweden. But on the other 
hand, Lallemand et al. (2007) find that the positive impact of wage dispersion on firm 
performance is stronger among blue-collar staff. 
  2.2.2 Uncertainty of the firm economic environment. The “tournament” model leads to 
the conclusion that there should be larger wage spreads when risk is more significant, in order 
to offset the reduction in effort induced by the higher prevalence of the luck factor (Lazear, 
1995). This reduction in the level of effort comes from the fact that workers will not compete 
hard to win the prize as luck is an important factor and they therefore have less influence over 
their output.  
  Prendergast (2002) also argues that pay-for-performance mechanisms will be more 
widely used in the presence of high uncertainty by introducing the notion of delegation: 
“uncertain environments result in the delegation of responsibilities, which in turn generates 
incentive pay based on output” (p. 1072). This is because in riskier environments, the 
principal is less able to figure out how the agent should optimally behave. In consequence, 
“input monitoring will be used in stable settings, but less so in more uncertain environments, 
where workers will be offered more discretion but will have their actions constrained by tying 






  Both authors thus suggest a positive relation between uncertainty and wage dispersion. 
But this does not mean that the analysed relationship, i.e. the impact of wage dispersion on 
firm productivity, should be stronger in the case of high uncertainty. On the contrary, the 
“tournament” model leads to the conclusion that workers will not compete hard to win the 
prize if uncertainty is high. So, from this point of view, the impact of wage dispersion on firm 
performance should be weaker in the presence of higher uncertainty.  
  “Fairness” considerations also tend to support this weaker relation. Indeed, according 
to Pfeffer and Langton (1993), wage inequality will be perceived as more fair if rewards are 
allocated on a fair basis, that is to say if they “are based on criteria that are normatively 
valued” (p. 385). From this argument, we may assume that the impact of wage dispersion on 
firm performance is weaker in the presence of high uncertainty, as in this case workers have 
less control over their effort-output relation and therefore consider pay-for-performance as 
more unfair. So both arguments suggest that a weaker relation between wage dispersion and 
productivity should appear in the case of higher uncertainty. 
 
3. Methodology  
Two types of wage dispersion indicators can be found in the literature: unconditional 
indicators, where wage dispersion is measured between heterogeneous workers, and 
conditional indicators, where wage dispersion is measured between workers with similar 
observable characteristics. A conditional indicator appears more appropriate to examine 
theories such as “tournaments” or “fairness” since they refer to wage differentials between 
similar workers. We thus examine the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity using a 
conditional indicator for wage dispersion.  
  To compute our conditional wage inequality indicator, we follow the Winter-Ebmer 
and Zweimüller (1999) methodology which rests upon a two-step estimation procedure. In the 
first step, we estimate by OLS the following wage equation for each firm separately: 
 
ln wij = α0 + yij α1 + εij                                                                                                             (1) 
 
where wij is the gross hourly wage of worker i in firm j, yij is the vector of individual 
characteristics including age, age squared, sex, education (2 dummies) and occupation (1 






  The standard deviations of the residuals of these regressions run firm by firm, σj, are 
then used as a conditional measure of wage dispersion in the second step, which consists in 
estimating the following firm-level performance equation:  
 
ln va_workj = β0 + β1 σj (+ β2 σj²) + xj β3 + zj β4 + νj                          (2) 
 
where va_workj is the performance of firm j, measured by the average value added per 
worker; σj is the conditional wage dispersion indicator, in level (and in most specifications 
also in quadratic form in order to test for a hump-shaped relationship); xj contains aggregated 
characteristics of workers in firm j, i.e. the share of the workforce that: i) has at most attended 
lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 25 and 
older than 50 years, respectively, the share of women and the share of blue-collar workers; zj 
includes firm characteristics, i.e. the sectoral affiliation (7 dummies), the size of the firm 
(number of workers) and the level of wage bargaining (2 dummies); and νj is the error term. 
  In order to investigate whether the relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
productivity depends on working environments and first on the skill level of the workforce, 
we improve the usual distinction between white- and blue-collar workers which might not be 
the most appropriate, as some blue-collar staff occupy jobs requiring more skills than those 
brought to bear by white-collar staff. We therefore measure the level of workforce skills by 
combining information on the workers’ level of education and occupation, assuming that 
highly skilled workers have a higher level of education than their low-skilled counterparts and 
thus also occupy jobs requiring more skills. For this purpose, we generate several classes for 
the educational level and for the abilities required by occupation. On the one hand, the “low 
educational level” includes workers who have attained lower secondary qualifications at 
most; the “intermediate educational level” groups together workers who have achieved upper 
secondary qualifications; and the “high educational level” is constituted by workers who have 
achieved at least a higher non academic qualification. On the other hand, the “low ability 
occupation” includes workers whose occupations fall into groups 7 to 9 from the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (craft and related trades workers; plant and machine 
operators and assemblers; and elementary occupations); the “intermediate ability occupation” 
comprises workers belonging to groups 4 and 5 (clerks; and service workers and shop and 
market sales workers); and the “high ability occupation” is constituted by groups 1 to 3 
(legislators, senior officials and managers; professionals; and technicians and associate 
professionals)






firm presents both a proportion of highly (low-) educated workers and a proportion of high- 
(low-) ability occupations larger than their respective medians on the whole sample. 
  In order to analyse the role played by the uncertainty of the firm economic 
environment, we use the following two indicators: mean rates of bankruptcy at the NACE 3 
digits level from 1997 to 2003 and the coefficient of variation of the net operating surplus at 
the NACE 2 digits level from 1997 to 2003. We then estimate equation (2) separately for: i) 
firms belonging to sectors whose bankruptcy rate is lower vs. higher than the median rate of 
the whole sample, and ii) firms in sectors whose coefficient of variation of the net operating 
surplus is below vs. above the median value of the whole sample. 
  Finally, one problem to control for is the potential simultaneity between firm 
productivity and wage dispersion. Indeed, it may be argued that highly productive firms may 
pay larger wages to their most productive workers, which in turn leads to more wage 
dispersion. We address this issue by estimating equation (2) with the log of value added per 
worker of 2004 instead of that of 2003, assuming that the value added of 2004 does not 
influence the wage structure of 2003.  
 
4. Data set 
Our sample is constituted from a matching of two large-scale data sets, both conducted by 
Statistics Belgium. The first is the 2003 “Structure of Earnings Survey” (SES). It covers all 
Belgian firms employing at least 10 workers and with economic activities within sections C to 
K of the NACE Rev.1 nomenclature. This survey contains a wealth of information, provided 
by the management of the firms, on the characteristics of both individual employees (e.g. age, 
education, gross earnings, paid hours, sex, occupation) and firms (e.g. sector of activity, 
number of workers, level of collective wage bargaining). Gross hourly wages are calculated 
by dividing gross earnings (including overtime earnings and premiums for shift work, night 
work and/or weekend work) in the reference period (October 2003) by the corresponding 
number of total paid hours (including overtime). 
  The SES provides no financial information. This is why we combine it with the 2003 
“Structure of Business Survey” (SBS) which is a firm-level survey with a different coverage 
than the SES in that it does not cover the whole financial sector (NACE J) but only Other 
Financial Intermediation (NACE 652) and the Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation 
(NACE 67). The SBS contains firm-level information on financial variables such as sales, 






Both datasets have been matched by Statistics Belgium using the firm social security number 
as identifier.  
  The computation of our conditional wage dispersion indicator requires a large number 
of individual observations per firm. We therefore restrict our sample to firms employing at 
least 200 workers, which guarantees a minimum of 10 observations per firm. We then 
consider the regular labour force and thus eliminate apprentices, workers younger than 18, 
older than 65 or being paid a gross hourly wage of less than 6 euros
[4]. We also exclude firms 
that present negative value added and workers or firms for which data are missing. Our 
definitive sample is representative of all firms employing at least 200 workers within sections 
C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature, with the exception of electricity, gas and water 
supply (NACE E) and large parts of the financial sector (NACE J). It covers 20,574 workers 
from 649 firms in 2003.  
 
[Take in Table 1] 
 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables. It indicates that we are looking at 
large firms of 408 workers on average with a mean gross hourly wage of 14.83 euros and a 
conditional hourly wage dispersion of 0.16 euro. In contrast, the average unconditional hourly 
wage dispersion amounts to 4.61 euros, which thus emphasises that considerable 
heterogeneity is encompassed by our conditional indicator. We also observe that the annual 
value-added per worker amounts to 75,919 euros, the mean age of workers is about 38 years, 
approximately 31% of the workers are women, 50% are blue-collar and 37% have a low level 
of education (i.e. lower secondary school at most). Firms are essentially concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector (49%), wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods (18%) and in real estate, renting and business activities 
(13%). Finally, let us note that the average number of observations per firm is around 32, with 
a minimum of 10 and a maximum of 282.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Wage dispersion and firm performance: general specification 
We first estimate equation (2) using standard OLS technique. The results presented in Table 
2
[5] reveal the existence of a positive and significant relationship between wage dispersion and 






to 1.4 and yields an elasticity of 0.22 at sample mean. This result therefore suggests that, on 
average, a rise of 10% in wage dispersion increases firm productivity by 2.2%. 
 
[Take in Table 2] 
 
  Our methodological option in order to control for the potential simultaneity between 
wage dispersion and firm productivity confirms this result. The same robustness check has 
been applied to all the results presented below and, on the whole, it confirms them (see 
Appendix II). 
  This positive influence of wage dispersion on firm productivity thus tends to support 
the “tournament” model. We can however assume that the relationship could in fact be hump-
shaped. Indeed, an overly small wage dispersion level might negatively affect firm 
performance due to a lack of incentives and in this case raising wage dispersion should 
increase firm performance. However, excessive wage dispersion might also be harmful for 
productivity because of fairness effects. We have therefore tested for a hump-shaped 
relationship by adding our wage dispersion indicator in quadratic form to equation (2). The 
findings reported in the third column of Table 2 show that the coefficient of wage dispersion 
in level is again positive and significant and that our wage dispersion indicator in quadratic 
form presents a significant negative coefficient. So evidence appears in favour of a hump-
shaped relationship between wage dispersion and productivity for large Belgian firms. Our 
results therefore tend to support both the “tournament” and “fairness” theories. Indeed, they 
indicate that up to (beyond) a certain level of wage dispersion, the incentive effects of 
“tournaments” dominate (are dominated by) “fairness” considerations. 
  The results in Table 2 also allow us to estimate that productivity is greatest when the 
conditional wage dispersion indicator amounts to 0.34 euro. Beyond this value, increasing 
wage dispersion would then decrease firm performance. Comparing this turning point with 
descriptive statistics suggests that wage dispersion in the Belgian private sector is suboptimal 
from a productivity point of view. Indeed, the optimal value for wage dispersion is found to 
be more than twice as high as the one observed in our sample. 
 
5.2. Wage dispersion and firm performance in different working environments 
  5.2.1 Skills of the workforce. Various above-mentioned theories suggest that the 






the workforce. Table 3 presents the impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity depending 
on whether the workforce is highly or low-skilled. 
 
[Take in Table 3] 
 
  Results first highlight again the existence of a significant hump-shaped relationship 
between wage dispersion and firm productivity, whatever the skill level of the workforce. 
They also emphasise significant (at the one percent level) differences in the magnitude of the 
coefficients of wage dispersion between the different levels of workforce skill. Indeed, the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the wage dispersion variables in level and in quadratic form 
is larger for firms with a highly skilled workforce, that is to say for firms with a small 
proportion of low-skilled workers and for firms with a large proportion of highly skilled 
workers. We estimate from Table 3 that value added per worker is greatest when the 
conditional hourly wage dispersion amounts to 0.22 euro within firms with a large proportion 
of low-skilled workers and 0.33 euro within firms with a large proportion of highly skilled 
workers, against sample mean values of 0.13 and 0.20 euro respectively. 
  So, the effect of pay dispersion on firm productivity is stronger for highly skilled 
workers than for their low-skilled counterparts. This result thus tends to support Prendergast’s 
(2002) and Barth et al.’s (2008) arguments. Overall, a broader wage dispersion, suggestive of 
larger pay-for-performance mechanisms, should have a greater impact on firm performance 
among highly skilled workers due to their higher monitoring costs and productivity-effort 
elasticity.  
  5.2.2 Uncertainty of the firm economic environment. In order to estimate the impact of 
wage dispersion on firm performance depending on whether the environment presents a high 
degree of uncertainty or not, we estimate equation (2) according to whether or not the mean 
rate of bankruptcy and the coefficient of variation of net operating surplus (taken separately) 
are larger than their respective medians on the whole sample. 
 
[Take in Table 4] 
 
  The results, presented in Table 4, reveal a significantly (at the one percent level) 
greater impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity when the environment is less 
uncertain, whatever the indicator of uncertainty considered. As expected from a theoretical 






presence of high uncertainty as in this case workers should have less control over their effort-
output relation and associate higher uncertainty with more unfair environments. The impact of 
wage dispersion on firm performance nevertheless remains positive in uncertain 
environments. The turning point of the relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
performance arrives significantly (at the one percent level) later in presence of less 
uncertainty, though the difference is relatively small. Indeed, if we focus on the coefficient of 
variation of net operating surplus
[6], productivity is greatest when the conditional hourly wage 
dispersion amounts to 0.32 euro in the presence of high uncertainty and to 0.35 euro when 
uncertainty is low, against sample mean values of 0.16 euro for both. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we analyse the sign and magnitude of the 
impact of wage dispersion on firm productivity in the Belgian private sector. There is in fact 
no consensus regarding this important question in the theoretical and empirical literature. 
Secondly, we examine whether the relationship between wage dispersion and firm 
productivity varies across different working environments. Indeed, while Pfeffer and Langton 
(1993, p.383) point out that “one of the more useful avenues for research on pay systems may 
be precisely this task of determining not which pay scheme is best but, rather, under what 
conditions salary dispersion has positive effects and under what conditions it has negative 
effects”, studies on this issue are scarce. On the one hand, we investigate the role played by 
the skill levels of the workforce, using a more appropriate indicator than the standard 
distinction between white- and blue-collar workers. To do so, we combine information on 
levels of education and occupations. On the other, we analyse the interaction with the 
uncertainty of the firm economic environment. This has, to our knowledge, never been 
explored before on an empirical basis. 
Our methodology is consistent with that of Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) 
which consists in a two-step estimation procedure. In the first step, we compute a conditional 
wage dispersion indicator by taking the standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm 
separately. In the second step, we estimate a firm-level productivity equation in which the 
conditional wage dispersion indicator is the main explanatory variable. The productivity of a 
firm is measured by the value added per worker. We also test for a possible hump-shaped 
relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity and address the potential problem 






  Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed matched employer-employee data set 
derived from the combination of the 2003 Structure of Earnings Survey and the 2003 
Structure of Business Survey. It is representative of all firms employing at least 200 workers 
within sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature, with the exception of the 
electricity, gas and water supply sector (NACE E) and large parts of the financial sector 
(NACE J). It covers 20,574 workers from 649 firms in 2003. 
  Our results show the existence of a significant hump-shaped relationship between 
wage dispersion and firm productivity for investigated working environments. They support 
both the “tournament” and “fairness” theories and confirm the following intuition: up to 
(beyond) a certain level of wage dispersion, the incentive effects of “tournaments” dominate 
(are dominated by) “fairness” considerations.  
Moreover, we find that the intensity of this relationship is stronger for highly skilled 
workers. This might be explained by the fact that monitoring costs and production-effort 
elasticity are greater for those workers. Wage dispersion would thus have a larger positive 
impact on the productivity of highly skilled workers because i) it ensures that they act in the 
optimal way without forcing the firm to pay higher monitoring costs and ii) they can increase 
their level of output more easily than their low-skilled counterparts as their output is more 
sensitive to their effort.  
The intensity of the relationship between wage dispersion and firm productivity is also 
found to be stronger within firms operating in a more stable environment. This could be due 
to the fact that pay-for-performance mechanisms influence workers’ effort less in the presence 
of higher uncertainty as in this case workers have less control over their effort-output relation 
and associate higher uncertainty with more unfair environments. A related explanation, based 
on ‘tournaments’ considerations, may be that workers will not compete hard to win a prize 
when uncertainty is greater. 
Finally, a comparison of the estimated turning points of the relation and descriptive 
statistics from our sample suggests that roughly doubling the currently observed wage 









[1] For professional baseball teams, see Bloom (1999), Depken (2000), Harder (1992) or 
Richards and Guell (1998). For hockey teams, see Gomez (2002).  
[2] In contrast, analysing managers of large US firms, Leonard (1990) finds no significant 
relationship between the standard deviation of pay and firm performance. 
[3] The sixth group of the ISCO classification, i.e. “skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery 
workers”, is not included in our data set given that it covers sections C to K of the NACE 
nomenclature. 
[4] It is worth mentioning that including these categories of workers would most likely not 
change our results, as they represent only 0.2 % of the total number of workers.  
[5] Detailed results, including control variables, are presented in Appendix I. 
[6] Given that the regression coefficient associated to the squared wage dispersion variable is 
not significant for firms belonging to sectors whose mean rates of bankruptcy are larger than 













Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1988), “Fairness and Unemployment”, American 
  Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 78 No. 2, pp. 44-49. 
Akerlof, G. A. and Yellen, J. L. (1990), “The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and 
 Unemployment”,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105 No. 2, pp. 255-283. 
Barth, E., Bratsberg, B., Haegeland, T. and Raaum, O. (2008), “Who Pays for Performance”, 
  International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 8-29.  
Beaumont, P. B. and Harris, R. I. D. (2003), “Internal Wage Structure and 
 Organizational  Performance”,  British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 41 No. 1, 
 pp.  53-70. 
Belfield, R. and Marsden, D. (2003), “Performance Pay, Monitoring Environments, and 
 Establishment  Performance”,  International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 
 452-471.   
Bingley, P. and Eriksson, T. (2001), “Pay Spread and Skewness, Employee Effort and Firm 
  Productivity”, Working Paper 01-2, Department of Economics, Aarhus School of 
  Business, University of Aarhus, Denmark.        
Bloom, M. (1999), “The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion on Individuals and 
 Organizations”,  Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 42 No. 1, pp. 25-40. 
Braakmann, N. (2008), “Intra-Firm Wage Inequality and Firm Performance – First Evidence 
  from German Linked Employer-Employee-Data”, Working paper 77, Working Paper 
  Series in Economics, University of Lüneburg, Germany. 
Cowherd, D. M. and Levine, D. I. (1992), “Product Quality and Pay Equity between 
  Lower-level Employees and Top Management: An Investigation of Distributive 
 Justice  Theory”,  Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 302-320. 
Depken, C. A. (2000), “Wage Disparity and Team Productivity. Evidence from Major 
 League  Baseball”,  Economics Letters, Vol. 67 No. 1, pp. 87-92.  
Eriksson, T. (1999), “Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on 
 Danish  Data”,  Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 262-280.  
Foss, N. J. and Laursen K. (2005), “Performance Pay, Delegation and Multitasking under 
  Uncertainty and Innovativeness: An Empirical Investigation”, Journal of Economic 
 Behavior  &  Organization, Vol. 58 No. 2, pp. 246-276. 
Frick, B., Prinz, J. and Winkelmann, K. (2003), “Pay Inequalities and Team Performance: 
  Empirical Evidence from the North American Major Leagues”, International Journal 






Gomez, R. (2002), “Salary Compression and Team Performance: Evidence from the National 
 Hockey  League”,  Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 4, pp. 203-220. 
Grund, C. and Westergaard-Nielsen, N. (2008), “The Dispersion of Employees’ Wage 
  Increases and Firm Performance”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 61 No. 
  4, pp. 485-501. 
Harder, J. W. (1992), “Play for Pay: Effects of Inequity in a Pay-for-Performance Context”, 
  Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 321-335. 
Heyman, F. (2005), “Pay Inequality and Firm Performance: Evidence from Matched 
 Employer-employee  Data”,  Applied Economics, Vol. 37 No. 11, pp. 1313-1327.   
Hibbs, D. A. Jr. and Locking, H. (2000), “Wage Dispersion and Productive Efficiency: 
  Evidence for Sweden”, Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 755-782. 
Jirjahn, U. and Kraft, K. (2007), “Intra-firm Wage Dispersion and Firm Performance – Is 
  There a Uniform Relationship?”, Kyklos, Vol. 60 No. 2, pp. 231-253. 
Lallemand, T., Plasman, R. and Rycx, F. (2007), “Wage Structure and Firm Productivity in 
  Belgium”, Working paper 12978, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge.  
Lazear, E. P. (1989), “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 
  Vol. 97 No. 3, pp. 561-580. 
Lazear, E. P. (1995), Personnel Economics, MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.).  
Lazear, E. P. and Rosen, S. (1981), “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor 
 Contracts”,  Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 No. 5, pp. 841-864. 
Leonard, J. (1990), “Executive Pay and Firm Performance”, Industrial and Labor Relations 
 Review, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 13-29. 
Levine, D. I. (1991), “Cohesiveness, Productivity and Wage Dispersion”, Journal of 
  Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 237-255. 
Main, B., G., O’Reilly, C., A. and Wade, J. (1993), “Top Executive Pay: Tournament or 
 Teamwork?”,  Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 606-628. 
Martins, P. S. (2008), “Dispersion in Wage Premiums and Firm Performance”, Economics 
 Letters, Vol. 101 No.1, pp. 63-65. 
McLaughlin, K. J. (1988), “Aspects of Tournaments Models: A Survey”, Journal of 
 Labor  Economics, Vol. 15, pp. 403-430.  
Milgrom, P. (1988), “Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organisation 






Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1990), “The Efficiency of Equity in Organisational Decision 
 Processes”,  American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 
 154-159.   
Pfeffer, J. and Langton, N. (1993), “The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, 
  Productivity, and Working Collaboratively: Evidence from College and University 
 Faculty”,  Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38, pp. 382-407.  
Prendergast, C. (2002), “The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives”, Journal  of 
 Political  Economy, Vol. 110 No. 5, pp. 1071-1102.  
Richards, D. G. and Guell, R. C. (1998), “Baseball Success and the Structure of  Salaries”, 
  Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 5 No. 5, pp. 291-296. 
White, H. (1980), “A heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct 
  test for heteroscedasticity”, Econometrica, Vol. 48 No. 4, pp. 817-838.  
Winter-Ebmer, R. and Zweimüller, J. (1999), “Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion and Firm 
















Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables 
Variables: Mean  Std.  Dev.
Annual value added per employee (€)  75,918.95  63,280.85
Gross hourly wage (€)  14.83  3.76 
Gross monthly wage (€)  2,311.34  758.46 
Intra-firm wage dispersion (€): 
     Conditional wage dispersion
1  0.16 0.07 
     Unconditional wage dispersion
2 4.61  3.14 
Age (years)  38.17  3.78 
Females (%)  31.32  26.33 
Education (%): 
     No degree, primary/lower secondary
  36.54 32.03 
     General upper secondary, technical/artistic/prof. upper secondary   38.76  26.99 
     Higher non university, university and post graduate  24.7  25.8 
Blue-collar workers
3 (%)   50.3  35.92 
Size of firm (number of workers)  407.92  394.09 
Sector (%): 
     Mining and quarrying (C)   0.59   
     Manufacturing (D)   48.84   
     Construction (F)   6.52   
     Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
     and personal and household goods (G)   17.96  
     Hotels and restaurants (H)   2.24   
     Transport, storage and communication (I)   9.4   
     Financial intermediation (J)   1.2   
     Real estate, renting and business activities (K)   13.26   
Number of observations (sampled workers) per firm  31.67  17.48 
Number of workers  20,574 
Number of firms  649 
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the 
wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard errors of wage 
regressions run for each firm separately). 
2 Standard deviation of gross hourly wages within each firm. 
3 The 
distinction between blue- and white-collar workers is based on the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO-88). Workers belonging to groups 1 to 5 are considered to be white-collar workers (1: 
Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2: Professionals; 3: Technicians and associate professionals; 4: 
Clerks; 5: Service workers and shop and market sales workers) and those from groups 7 to 9 are considered to be 
blue-collar workers (7: Craft and related trades workers; 8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers; 9: 














Table 2: Wage dispersion and firm productivity 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) 














2 Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics
3 Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R²   0.47  0.48 
F-stat 35.48**  34.44** 
Number of firms  649  649 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital 
variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) 
methodology (i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
2 Share of the workforce 
that: i) has at most attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 
25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of blue-collar workers are also 
included. 






 Table 3: Wage dispersion and firm productivity by workforce skill level 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) 
 Large  proportion
1 Small  proportion
2 Large  proportion
3 Small  proportion
4 































6  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics
7  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R²   0.55  0.35  0.31  0.57 
F-stat 30.04**  9.71**  8.26**  28.24** 
Number of firms  218  222  261  262 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Proportion of poorly 
educated workers and proportion of low-ability occupations larger than their medians (respectively 0.281 and 0.625). 
2 Proportion of poorly educated workers and proportion 
of low-ability occupations smaller than their respective medians. 
3 Proportion of highly educated workers and proportion of high-ability occupations larger than their median, 
respectively 0.176 and 0.145. 
4 Proportion of highly educated workers and proportion of high-ability occupations smaller than their respective medians. 
5 Hourly residual wage 
dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology 
(i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
6 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years 
of tenure and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of blue-collar workers are also included. 
7 Sectoral affiliation (7 








Table 4: Wage dispersion and firm productivity by degree of uncertainty 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) 
  Mean rate of bankruptcy  CV of net operating surplus 
 High  uncertainty
1 Low  uncertainty
2 High  uncertainty
































6  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics
7  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R²    0.54 0.45 0.35 0.62 
F-stat  37.34** 13.32** 12.45** 43.62** 
Number  of  firms  313 336 365 284 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Mean rate of bankruptcy 
larger than its median (0.013). 
2 Mean rate of bankruptcy smaller than its median. 
3 Coefficient of variation (CV) of net operating surplus larger than its median (0.193). 
4 CV 
of net operating surplus smaller than its median.
 5 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage 
equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
6 Share of the workforce 
that: i) has at most attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women 
and the share of blue-collar workers are also included. 





 Appendix I  
 
Wage dispersion and firm productivity: detailed regression results 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) 






















































Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, 











































Adjusted R²   0.47  0.48 
F-stat 35.48**  34.44** 
Number of firms  649  649 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital 
variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) 






Appendix II  
 
II. 1. Wage dispersion and (one year lead) firm productivity  
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) of 2004 














2 Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics
3 Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R²   0.41  0.41 
F-stat 30.54**  29.67** 
Number of firms  649  649 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital 
variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) 
methodology (i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
2 Share of the workforce 
that: i) has at most attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 
25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of blue-collar workers are also 
included. 














 II.2. Wage dispersion and (one year lead) firm productivity by workforce skill level 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) of 2004 
 Large  proportion
1 Small  proportion
2 Large  proportion
3 Small  proportion
4 































6  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm characteristics
7  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R²   0.4  0.34  0.22  0.48 
F-stat 17.45**  18.32**  7.55**  16.89** 
Number of firms  218  222  261  262 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Proportion of poorly 
educated workers and proportion of low-ability occupations larger than their medians, respectively 0.281 and 0.625. 
2 Proportion of poorly educated workers and proportion of 
low-ability occupations smaller than their respective medians. 
3 Proportion of highly educated workers and proportion of high-ability occupations larger than their median, 
respectively 0.176 and 0.145. 
4 Proportion of highly educated workers and proportion of high-ability occupations smaller than their respective medians. 
5 Hourly residual wage 
dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology 
(i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
6 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years 
of tenure and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of blue-collar workers are also included. 
7 Sectoral affiliation (7 
dummies), number of workers and level of wage bargaining (2 dummies).  
 






II.3. Wage dispersion and (one year lead) firm productivity by degree of uncertainty 
Dependent variable:  Value added per worker (ln) of 2004 
  Mean rate of bankruptcy  CV of net operating surplus 
 High  uncertainty
1 Low  uncertainty
2 High  uncertainty
































6  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics
7  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted  R²    0.52 0.37 0.33 0.51 
F-stat  33.06** 12.6** 10.06**  34.16** 
Number  of  firms  313 336 365 284 
Notes: **/*/° significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. White (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors are shown in brackets. 
1 Mean rate of bankruptcy 
larger than its median (0.013). 
2 Mean rate of bankruptcy smaller than its median. 
3 CV of net operating surplus larger than its median (0.193). 
4 CV of net operating surplus 
smaller than its median. 
5 Hourly residual wage dispersion after controlling for human capital variables and workers’ characteristics in the wage equation following the 
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1999) methodology (i.e. standard errors of wage regressions run for each firm separately). 
6 Share of the workforce that: i) has at most 
attended lower secondary school, ii) has more than 10 years of tenure and iii) is younger than 25 and older than 50 years, respectively. The share of women and the share of 
blue-collar workers are also included. 
7 Sectoral affiliation (7 dummies), number of workers and level of wage bargaining (2 dummies).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 